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Five Key Points From this Study 
This study explores the evolution of cooperative interfirm networks and 
examines how the changing network causally varies with firms’ performance outcomes. 
The study concerns venture capital (VC) firms co-investing (syndicating) in 
ventures. An agent-based stochastic model of 40 UK-based VC firms, their syndicate 
structures and investment outcomes, from 1995 to 2000, shows highly connected firms 
outperforming peripheral firms. 
The findings of this study are consistent with a ‘network effect’; greater 
interfirm connectedness causes higher performance outcomes. 
The study also finds performance to be contagious; a firm’s partners’ 
performances can subsequently affect the focal firm’s performance. 
The study offers a model robust to control variables. While risk aversion 
explains much of the structure of interfirm cooperation, being well-connected explains 
out-performance. VC firms benefit from syndication with a range of successful peers. 
One line abstract: Interfirm connectedness causes higher performance outcomes 
and higher performance is contagious between cooperating firms. 
Keywords: Network evolution, social network, syndication, venture capital, 
performance, risk 
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Firm Performance and the Evolution of Cooperative Interfirm Networks: 
UK Venture Capital Syndication 
1. Introduction
Forming networks of interorganizational cooperation is vital to firms. Network 
position and connectedness (the count of interfirm cooperative ties) is correlated with, 
for example, firms’ longevity, profitability, and innovativeness (Ahuja, 2000). Being 
well connected is a kind of resource. Consistent with the resource-based view, a high 
quantity and quality of interfirm relations can be viewed as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Kay, 1993). 
Given the importance of cooperative networks, research has turned to the 
underlying question of how and why networks change. The study of network evolution 
is prominent (Checkley, M.S., Añón Higón, D., Angwin, D., 2010; Koka, Madhavan, 
Prescott, 2006). To better understand how cooperative interfirm networks evolve, this 
paper addresses two interrelated objectives: what drives the selection of firms’ network 
partners over time? What network changes, if any, explain firms’ performance 
outcomes? These issues are viewed in the context of venture capital firms, and their 
syndication activity, over time. 
Venture capital firms depend on interorganizational cooperation. A high 
proportion of their investments in young, high growth potential ventures are shared – or 
“syndicated” – between VC firms (Bygrave, 1987). This study takes venture capital 
syndication to define a strategic network, that is, when two venture capital firms 
coinvest in a venture, they define an interfirm tie of cooperation between them. The 
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numerous VC firms co-investing (and divesting) in numerous ventures over years 
creates a dynamic network.  
 
 The following section selectively reviews the current understanding of interfirm 
network evolution. This section also examines the relationship between social network 
position and performance outcomes, and emphasizes the context of venture capital. 
This is followed by a discussion of the research methods and an analysis of the study’s 
results. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are drawn.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 This review includes two sections. First, is a discussion of the research context 
and findings of comparable empirical research in venture capital syndication. Next, the 
paper addresses the theoretical literature relating to interorganizational network 
evolution. Hypotheses are derived.  
 
2.1 The Venture Capital Context 
 
 Syndication is important to VCs. In all UK VC investments (1993-2002), 27 
percent by volume and 38 percent by value are syndicated. For all UK VC investments 
(1993-2002), where an exit was achieved via stock market flotation, or, synonymously, 
via initial public offering (“IPO”), 44 percent by volume and 69 percent by value are 
syndicated (Checkley, Añón Higón, Angwin, 2010; I.E. Consulting, 2004). Comparable 
figures are seen for the US venture capital market (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; 
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Jääskeläinen, 2011). IPOs are critical to VCs because they typically offer the highest 
returns on investment in ventures.  
 Increasing connectedness is precedent, by one to three years, to improved 
performance, as measured by investment exits and IPO generation (Hochberg 
Ljungqvist, Lu, 2007; Seppa, Jaaskelainen, 2002; Seppa, 2001). All the prior 
researchers use dynamic regression analysis on a panel of US-based VC firms. In US 
venture capital, the formation of more syndication ties is followed by enhanced 
performance.  
 
2.2 Interfirm Network Evolution 
 
 Inter-firm ties lead to garnering unique skills or knowledge for the relevant 
firms (Kogut, 1988; Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005). Transferring skills 
or knowledge creates the prospect for outperformance to be contagious between firms. 
Interfirm ties permit access to strategic resources not otherwise conveniently 
obtainable. The larger a firm’s resource deficiency, the greater that firm’s impetus to 
forge alliances (Ahuja, 2000). On this analysis, a well-resourced firm has less 
motivation to attach to another correspondingly successful firm. Firms search for more 
varied and distant relationships as they mature and become less resource deficient (Hite 
and Hesterly, 2001). 
 
 Firms seek partners on the basis of their observable resources. Firms with more, 
or better, observable resources are more attractive as partners.  The attractiveness of a 
firm can be gauged with information on its resources, or with the potential partner’s 
past performance (Baum, 2000). In summary, the “resource dependence” view argues 
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that a firm with valuable resources is an attractive partner. Past success – such as IPO 
generation for a VC – is a means by which a firm’s resources are observable. 
 The causal links between performance (defined by IPO generation) and firm 
connectedness (defined by the syndication network) are explored by testing the 
following two hypothesized causal specifications: 
 
(H1) IPOs(one partner)  → SYNDICATION 
The first hypothesis concerns whether the IPO performance of a single VC causes 
change in the connectedness of this VC in the syndication network (consistent with the 
resource dependence view). 
 
(H2) IPOs(both partners)  → SYNDICATION 
The second hypothesis concerns who chooses who to syndicate, for example, whether 
high performers prefer to syndicate with, likewise, high performers (inconsistent with 
the resource dependence view).  
 
 Resource dependence arguments emphasize that interorganizational networks 
aid in resource acquisition. However, the specific choice of exchange partner might be 
influenced by incentives unrelated to resource accretion. Partner choice is determined 
by prior exchanges (Granovetter, 1985). Firms face considerable uncertainty in 
potential partners’ qualities; therefore, they prefer to preserve and cultivate existing 
relationships (Gulati, 1995).  Firms also favor cooperating with other firms that appear 
similar to themselves, perhaps in their technological specialism or status. Tie formation 
is driven by “homophily” (Powell et al., 2005).  
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Network connectedness, or “centrality,” is a proxy for status (Cook & Emerson, 
1978). Status indicates an actor’s quality, and the former increases in value with 
uncertainty about the quality of market participants (Podolny, 1994). Firms are more 
discriminating in their exchange relationships when uncertainty is amplified. In periods 
of greater uncertainty, firms are more likely to exchange with established partners, and 
with organizations of comparable status (Podolny, 1994).  
 
Status is also self-reinforcing (Merton, 1968). For example, the acclaim for a 
collaborative journal article tends to amass disproportionately to the best-known author. 
This “Matthew effect” allows a well-connected firm to harvest an “accumulative 
advantage” (Powell et al., 2005), that is, enhanced performance outcomes.  This 
argument contrasts with the resource dependence view analyzed above. These latter 
arguments are labelled the “social structural view.”  
 
The study explores the causal links between firm “connectedness” (defined by 
the syndication network) and performance (defined by IPOs) by testing the following 
two hypothesized causal specifications: 
 
(H3) SYNDICATION → IPOs (one partner) 
The third hypothesis concerns whether the connectedness of a VC affects the 
performance of this VC (consistent with the social structural view). 
 
(H4) SYNDICATION and IPOs (one partner) → IPOs (other partner) 
The fourth hypothesis concerns whether performance is contagious via the syndication 
network, that is, whether the syndication of any VC with a (previously) high-
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performing partner VC enhances the (first) VC’s own performance (consistent with 
arguments for skill or knowledge transfer, which manifest network strategies 
concurring with resource dependence, but not inconsistent with the social structural 
view). 
 
 In summary, this study models network evolution and its causal relation to 
firms’ performance outcomes. The questions asked are: tie formation is impelled by 
what elements of network structure and by what firm attributes? Syndication is 
acknowledged to be driven by the desire to gain knowledge. New insight can lift 
performance. Is the spread of useful knowledge evinced by a “contagion effect,” 
whereby a firm’s achievements extend to its syndication partners? Does social structure 
mean that advantage is confined to elites of firms?  
 
3. Data and Research Methods 
 
 The analysis uses firm-year data. The data come from a commercial database, 
developed by IE Consulting, a firm specializing in tracking European private equity 
markets. This provides a UK-based data source comparable to the US-based Venture 
Economic database used in prior venture capital studies (Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994). 
Supplementary data are garnered from the British Venture Capital Association’s 
Directory of Members (BVCA, 2003), and from VC firms’ websites.  
 
 The IE Consulting database contains 10,000 observations of UK venture capital 
funding rounds, covering a six-year period, from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 
2000. The venture capital industry allows frequent observation of interfirm relations – 
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that is, the formation of syndicates – and thereby admits of statistical analysis. 
Syndication is also objectively definable, and a publicly announced and legally 
contracted relationship. Finally, syndicates themselves change over the years (Bygrave, 
1987); syndication can be treated as a longitudinal variable, permitting causal tests.  
 
 The sample is a panel of the 40 leading UK VC firms. These firms constitute 
more than 80 percent of all relevant resources and activities in the UK; syndications, 
funds invested, and IPOs generated (I.E. Consulting, 2004). They are ranked by their 
respective totals of portfolio companies. Prior studies have used a similar sampling 
strategy (Podolny, 2001). A time series of observations from each VC firm is taken. 
When two VC firms syndicate (coinvest, within a given venture, for the first time), 
within a given year, that is counted as one relation, or “tie” between them. They thereby 
form a dyad. The observations are annualized event data; they record for each year the 
event of forming a new tie (that is, co-investing in a uniquely-defined venture).  
 
 The data set includes investments in nearly 1,000 portfolio companies during 
the six years from 1995 to 2000 (1993 and 1994 are used for lagged values, as later 
discussed). This six-year interval offers homogeneous data (that is, does not include 
extremes of market turbulence) and is sufficiently large to produce a robust statistical 
model. Note that some of the “top 40” firms did not exist at the start of the period under 
examination. Therefore, the total number of firm-year observations of “active” firms is 
moderately less than 240 firm-years (= 40 firms x 6 years). Beyond the top 40 most-
frequently syndicating VCs in the UK, virtually no syndication occurs over the six 
years in question.  
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 The focus of analysis is the posited causal interrelation of a firm’s performance 
and its connectedness in the social network, as defined by syndication. Firm 
performance is assessed by a firm’s number of IPOs in a given year. A stochastic agent-
based model is employed (Snijders, Steglich, & van de Bunt, 2009; Snijders, 2005, 
provide a primer in these methods), which can express a variety of network change 
mechanisms under conditions of interdependence and dynamic feedback.  A stochastic 
agent-based model also facilitates hypothesis testing. The model is designed to meet the 
challenge of the numerous mutual dependencies (that is, every network variable 
directly depends on every other network variable) that both characterize network 
analyses and that bedevil traditional panel data regression methods. The nodes in the 
network represent social actors (here, VC firms), and the network ties represent a social 
relation (here, co-investment, or synonymously, syndication, by VC firms).  
 
 The model posits that the network evolves as a stochastic process “driven by the 
actors,” that is, the model can embody theories about how actors change their outgoing 
ties. The probabilities of tie changes are, in part, endogenously determined, as a 
function of the network structure itself. They are also in part, exogenously determined, 
as a function of characteristics of the nodes (“actor covariates”), and of characteristics 
of pairs of nodes (“dyadic covariates”). In their multivariate guise (Snijders, Steglich, & 
Schweinberger, 2007), stochastic actor-based models can be used to analyze 
longitudinal social network data, coupled with the changing attributes of actors, as joint 
dependent variables. This framework allows exploration of the relation between the 
VCs’ syndication network, and the VCs’ performances (as given by their annual IPO 
count). Upon request, the authors can provide a more detailed, technical account of the 
methods.  
10 
 
   
 
 
4. Results 
 
 A descriptive overview of the data under test is provided below. The section 
then discusses the results of the causality tests. These findings are subsequently brought 
together in a discussion.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 Below, Table 1 shows the total of the counts for the VC performance and the 
connectedness metrics. Four VC firms produce no IPOs over the six years in question. 
 
Table 1 here. 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the principle variables. Each is taken across a 
panel of 40 VC firms, for six years each (plus two lagged years; 1993 and 1994). The 
variable “IPO” is also analyzed with one-, two- and three-year lags; taking longer lags 
could have been desirable from a VC modelling point of view, but each extra lag results 
in a loss of data and thus degrades the overall statistics. Three-year lags are found to be 
the longest to maintain model rigor. Notably, less than 5 percent of any ties that are 
ever replicated take longer than three years until replication. Most VC firms invest in 
all major industrial sectors and most have offices in more than one region of the UK.  
 
Table 2 here. 
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Table 3 shows correlations across the variables under consideration. Centrality is 
positively correlated to all of the performance outcomes. The next section addresses the 
issue of causation.  
 
Table 3 here. 
 
4.2 Explanatory Statistics: Network Evolution and Causality 
 
This section consists of formal tests of the hypotheses. Results are shown from 
two models (in Table 4 below), one for each of the hypothesized causal directions. 
Each of the two models contains an analysis of the lagged values, with the time lag 
varying up to a maximum of three years. Part 1 models the change in the firms’ 
syndication levels as the dependent variable. Part 2 assesses performance, measured in 
terms of IPO count, as the dependent variable.   
 
Table 4 here. 
 
Part 1: Dependent Variable: Change in Syndication Levels 
No effect occurs of a VC firm’s past years’ IPOs on its selection of syndication 
partners. Having achieved many IPOs does not imply higher involvement in subsequent 
syndication activity. No special selectivity is found within IPO deal-making ability; for 
example, firms with high levels of IPO activity are not emphasizing the selection of 
each other nor are they avoiding each other. 
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VCs syndicate with few partners in any given year. A triangulation or “clique 
effect” occurs; that is, VCs tend to syndicate with a partner of a partner. A Matthew 
effect is in evidence; VCs prefer to syndicate with well-connected VCs. Past 
syndications tend to be repeated.  
 
No effect is found of common investments in the same industrial sector (i.e. as 
defined by the investee ventures) on syndication. Geographical proximity (that is, VCs 
having offices in the same region of the UK) promotes syndication. Syndication levels 
are not affected by VC firm age, the number of GPs, or the risk level of the investments 
made. 
 
Part 2: Dependent Variable: Change in IPO count 
 The number of a VC firm’s syndication partners, in recent years, statistically 
determines IPO levels. The average number of IPOs of these partners determines a 
VC’s own IPO generation. Evidence (p = 5.7%) is found for a “contagion effect,” with 
a time lag of one to two years.  
 
 A VC has few IPOs (less than 3) in any given year and no evidence is found for 
decreasing marginal returns on further IPOs. The control variables have no bearing on 
IPO generation.  
 
4.3 Summarizing the Results  
 Network effects are found; connectedness is positively related to subsequent 
performance. VC firms produce more IPOs when they have increased their syndication 
activity 1 or 2 years ago. The pattern of syndication is triangular; preferred partners 
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tend to be partners of partners, with regionally co-located offices. Well-connected firms 
are preferred. A contagion effect is present; having a partner with an IPO 1 to 2 years 
ago contributes to a VC firm’s IPO activity. The significance of the focal variables of 
connectedness and performance is robust to the addition of the control variables.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
 The findings provide support for Hypotheses 3 and 4; performance is positively 
related to connectedness, and greater connectedness is precedent to improved 
performance (in terms of IPO count) for a VC firm and its syndication partners. In 
contrast, no support is found for Hypotheses 1 and 2; improved performance does not 
cause connectedness. Successful firms do not seek syndication with similarly successful 
firms. Homophily (Powell et al., 2005) fails to explain tie formation for UK-based VC 
firms. Homophily is unrelated to partner selection in terms of investee risk level or 
sector specialization. More mature firms do not follow different syndication strategies 
in the network; this finding contradicts Hite and Hesterly (2001).  
 
 The UK VC market differs from that of the US. One explanation is that market 
size and market age effects explain the differences; the UK market is younger and less 
than one-fifth the size of the US market, in terms of VC funds invested. Less 
differentiation in UK-based VCs’ syndication strategies would be evident.  
 
 In explaining the causal relationship between success and centrality, the social 
structural view is stronger than resource dependence. The social structural view 
predicts that organizations benefit from being centrally placed in networks. The 
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evidence for triangulation, repetition of syndication ties, and a Matthew effect are each 
consistent with risk aversion in syndication strategy (Podolny, 2001). The focal results 
resonate with research on the US market (Hochberg et al., 2007), which suggests that 
connectedness causes outperformance. The UK also shows evidence of contagion 
effects, suggesting success in producing IPOs can transfer to syndication partners 
within two years. Speculatively, this phenomenon could be a product of beneficiary 
resources generated from the prior IPO itself. Alternatively, it could derive from the 
gain of insight to –  or capabilities in –  the IPO process. Yet, no evidence is found that 
a VC’s level of funds under management mediates its IPO generation. This suggests 
success contagion is due to transfers of information, skill, or social contacts and 
reputation, rather than to transfers of capital.  
 
 Along with metrics of VC centrality and performance, the analysis considers the 
time lags over which causal effects take place. Causation acts within a two-year cycle. 
VCs are commonly syndicating deals that then come to IPO within two years of the 
syndication. Many of the value-adding activities of the VC in a syndicate – such as 
helping to plan and build the management team – are completed within two years. 
Contagion effects are only evident with two-year lags, which is consistent with the 
value of transferred information, skills, reputations or relationships waning beyond that 
period.  
 
 A conceptual model is now developed of the drivers of network evolution and 
firm performance. This model blends, with the empirical findings, both resource 
dependence and social structural theory. Financial resources have an obvious logical 
priority in network formation; a VC firm cannot create ties in the first place if this firm 
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has no funds to co-invest. Resources (as a hygiene factor) create ties. Ties also create 
resources, resulting in network effects; evidence suggests that having more partners, 
and more successful partners, nurtures outperformance. Nonetheless, partner selection 
is also driven by risk aversion; that is, consistent with the repeated ties and triangulation 
effects found in the model, and with prior social structural research (Podolny, 2001), 
albeit with no link to performance outcomes. Risk mitigation arguments shed light on 
partner selection. Social structure and contagion arguments shed light on performance 
outcomes. The discussion concludes by further condensing the model: resources allow 
VC firms to engage; risk mitigation allows VCs firms to endure; ascending the social 
hierarchy allows enrichment.  
 
 VC managers should seek to syndicate frequently and particularly with other 
VCs that have produced IPOs within the last two years. Prospects of IPO generation are 
enhanced. The advantage accrues more because the network allows access to timely 
skills, relevant information or propitious social ties, rather than being due to material 
resources. Network effects and social contagion are prime concerns for cooperative 
strategy. 
 
 In common with other studies of cooperative networks, this research contains 
limitations, each of which presents opportunities for further study. This paper is based 
on the method of testing formal ties of VC syndication. Significant informal ties of 
cooperation may exist between firms, which involve, for example, the sharing of 
expertise. The understanding of informal ties can be improved with further study.  
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 Can this model be further generalized? By adapting part of a US-based 
framework (Seppa, 2001), this paper offers a robust empirical model of six years of 
UK-based venture capital activity. Some of the findings are comparable with prior 
empirical research in other national VC markets; usually meaning the US. Some 
dimensions of the model are consistent across time and geography. Future studies might 
test these network evolution methods beyond the venture capital context. In the realm 
of venture capital, advantages lie in testing data sets covering a 12-year cycle (12 years 
being the maximum term for most VC funds).  
 
 The status of the theories tested is now addressed. Through the explicit 
treatment of time, a shifting emphasis is seen in the power of different theories to 
explain. Highlighted here is the relative rarity of temporal empirical work in financial 
strategy and network studies. The development and application of prior theory owes 
much to a preponderance of non-temporal or “static” analyses. A temporal lacuna is 
also evident in other phenomena where time matters; not only VC syndication, but also 
in other strategic networks. In short, broad scope is argued for the models of networks 
that make richer use of time. This study is proposed as a step in that direction.  
 
5.1 Summary    
 
 This study contributes to knowledge in three ways. First, it provides an 
empirical agent-based model of the evolution of an interfirm cooperative network, in a 
way that offers causal insight into firms’ performance outcomes. Recently developed 
stochastic methods offer significant advantages over the dynamic panel data regression 
methods employed in prior studies. Second, this study develops new theoretical insights 
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to the drivers of network formation. Third, it draws upon an original dataset from the 
world’s second-largest venture capital market – the UK – suggesting both 
commonalities with much-studied US markets, along with some notable differences.  
 
 The findings are consistent with a ‘network effect’; more interfirm 
connectedness causes higher performance outcomes. In addition, evidence is uncovered 
for the contagiousness of superior performance; a firm’s partner’s performances can 
subsequently affect (the focal) firm’s performance.  
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